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Quantum game theory is a recently developing field of physical research. In this paper,
we investigate quantum games in a systematic way. With the famous instance of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, we present the fascinating properties of quantum games in different
conditions, i.e. different number of the players, different strategic space of the players
and different amount of the entanglement involved.
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1. Introduction
Game theory is a distinct and interdisciplinary approach to the study of human
behavior. The foundation of modern game theory can be traced back to the
mathematician John Von Neumann who, in collaboration with the mathematical
economist Oskar Morgenstern, wrote the mile stone book Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior [1]. Game theory has since become one of the most important
and useful tools for a wide range of research from the economics, social science to
biological evolution [2].
∗Fluctuation and Noise Letters, Special Issue on Game Theory and Evolutionary Processes: Order
from Disorder — The Role of Noise in Creative Processes, edited by D. Abbott, P.C.W. Davies
and C.R. Shalizi.
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Table 1. The payoff table for the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Bob: C Bob: D
Alice: C (3, 3) (0, 5)
Alice: D (5, 0) (1, 1)
However, game theory is now being developed in a completely new way. It is
extended into the quantum realm by physicists interested in quantum information
theory [3]. In quantum game theory, the players play the game abiding by quantum
rules. Therefore, the primary results of quantum games are very different from
those of their classical counterparts [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. For example,
in an otherwise fair zero-sum coin toss game, a quantum player can always win
against his classical opponent if he adopts quantum strategies [4, 5]. In some other
original dilemma games, problems can be resolved by playing with quantum rules
[6,7,8,12,14]. Besides the theoretical research on quantum games, a quantum game
has been experimentally realized on a NMR quantum computer [10, 15].
In this paper, we investigate quantum games in a systematic way. For the
particular case of the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma, we investigate this quantum
game in different conditions. These conditions differ in the number of players, the
strategic space and the role of entanglement in the quantum game. It is shown that
the properties of the quantum game can change fascinatingly with the variations of
the game’s conditions.
2. Quantum Games
In the remaining part of this paper, we take a detailed investigation of quantum
games with the particular case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Firstly, we present
the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma which has been presented in [6]. Secondly, we
investigate the three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the following discussions the
organization is as follows: (i) the classical version of the game, (ii) the quantization
scheme, and (iii) the investigation of the game with different strategic spaces.
2.1. Two-player prisoner’s dilemma
The publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was a particularly
important step in the development of game theory. But in some ways, Tucker’s
proposal of the problem of the Prisoners’ Dilemma was even more important. This
problem, which can be stated in one page, could be the most influential one in the
social sciences in the later half of the twentieth century. The name of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma arises from the following scenario: two burglars, Alice and Bob are caught
by the police and are interrogated in separate cells, without no communication
between them. Unfortunately, the police lacks enough admissible evidence to get a
jury to convict. The chief inspector now makes the following offer to each prisoner:
If one of them confess to the robbery, but the other does not, then the former will
get unit reward of 5 units and the latter will get nothing. If both of them confess,
then each get 1 unit as a reward. If neither of them confess, then each will get payoff
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Fig 1. The setup of two-player quantum games.
3. Since confession means a “defect” strategy and no confession means “cooperate”
with the other player, the classical strategies of the players are thus denoted by “D”
and “C”, respectively. Table 1 indicates the payoffs of Alice and Bob according to
their strategies.
From Table 1, we see that D is the dominant strategy of the game. Since the
players are rational and care only about their individual payoffs, both of them will
resort to the dominant strategy D and get payoff 1. In terms of game theory, (D,D)
is a dominant strategy equilibrium. However, this dominant strategy equilibrium is
inferior to the Pareto Optimal (C,C), which yields payoff 3 to each players. This
is the catch of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
2.1.1. Quantization scheme
Recently, this famous game got a new twist: It is studied in the quantum world by
physicists [6,7]. By allowing the players to adopt quantum strategies, it is interesting
to find that the original dilemma in the classical version of this game could be
removed. The physical model of this quantum game is illustrated in Fig 1. Different
from the classical game, each player has a qubit and can manipulate it independently
(locally) in the quantum version of this game. The quantum formulation proceeds
by assigning the possible outcomes of the classical strategies C and D the two basis
vectors of a qubit, denoted by
|C〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |D〉 =
(
0
1
)
. (1)
The gate
Jˆ = exp
{
iγDˆ ⊗ Dˆ/2
}
, (2)
with 0 6 γ 6 pi/2, can be considered as a gate which produce entanglement between
the two qubits. The game started from the pure state |CC〉. After passing through
the gate Jˆ , the game’s initial state is
|ψi〉 = Ĵ |CC〉 = cos γ
2
|CC〉+ i sin γ
2
|DD〉 . (3)
Since the entropy (entanglement) of |ψi〉 is
S = − sin2 γ
2
ln sin2
γ
2
− cos2 γ
2
ln cos2
γ
2
, (4)
the parameter γ can be reasonably considered as a measure of the game’s entangle-
ment.
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After the initial state was produced, each player apply a unitary operation on
his/her individual qubit. Later on, the game’s state goes through Jˆ† and the final
state is |ψf 〉. According to the corresponding entry of the payoff table (Table 1),
the explicit expressions of both player’s payoff functions can be written as follows:
$A = 3PCC + 1PDD + 5PDC + 0PCD,
$B = 3PCC + 1PDD + 0PDC + 5PCD, (5)
where $A ($B) represents Alice’s (Bob’s) payoff and Pσσ′ = |〈σσ′| ψf 〉|2 is the
probability that the final state will collapse into |σσ′〉. At the end of the game,
each player will get a reward according the payoff function.
In the following subsections, we investigate this quantum game with different
strategic spaces. It is interesting to find that the game’s property does not neces-
sarily become better with the extension of the strategic space.
2.1.2. Restricted strategic space
In this section, we will focus on the restricted strategic space situation, i.e. a two
parameter strategy set which is a subset of the whole unitary space [6]. The explicit
expression of the operator is given by
U(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos θ
2
sin θ
2
− sin θ
2
e−iφ cos θ
2
)
, (6)
where 0 6 θ 6 pi and 0 6 φ 6 pi/2. We can see that
U(0, 0) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
(7)
is the identity operator and
U(pi, 0) =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
(8)
is somehow equivalent to a bit-flip operator. The former corresponds to the classical
“cooperation” strategy and the latter to “defect”.
This situation has been investigated in details by Eisert et al. [6]. Here, we
present the main results of their work: (i) For a separable game with γ = 0, there
exists a pair of quantum strategies Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ, which is the Nash equilibrium and
yields payoff (1, 1). Indeed, this quantum game behaves “classically”, i.e. the Nash
equilibrium for the game and the final payoffs for the players are the same as in
the classical game. So the separable game does not display any features which go
beyond the classical game. (ii) For a maximally entangled quantum game with
γ = pi/2, there exists a pair of strategies Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ, which is a Nash equilibrium and
yields payoff (3, 3), having the property to be the Pareto optimal. Therefore the
dilemma that exists in the classical game is removed.
In the quantum game, we can see that in the decision-making step the player has
means of communication with each other, i.e. no one has any information about
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which strategy the other player will adopt. This is the same as in classical game.
Hence, it is natural to ask why the dilemma game shows such a fascinating property
in quantum game? The answer is entanglement, the key to the quantum information
and quantum computation [16, 17]. Although there is no communication between
the two players, the two qubits are entangled, and therefore one player’s local action
on his qubit will affect the state of the other. Entanglement plays as a contract of
the game.
In the Eisert et al.’s scheme, the dilemma was removed when the game’s state
is maximal entangled. It is also interesting to investigate the game’s behavior
when the amount of entanglement varies. In one of our previous works [7], we find
that there exist two thresholds of the game’s entanglement, γth1 = arcsin
√
1/5
and γth2 = arcsin
√
2/5. In different domains of entanglement, the quantum game
shows different properties. For 0 6 γ 6 γth1 , the quantum game behaves classically,
i.e. the Nash equilibrium of the game is Dˆ⊗ Dˆ and the final payoff for the players
are both 1, which are the same as the classical version of this game. Hence,the
quantum game does not display any features which go beyond the classical game
for the small amount of entanglement of the game’s state. For γth1 6 0 6 γth2,
the games shows some novel features which has no classical analog. In this domain,
Dˆ⊗ Dˆ is no longer Nash equilibrium of the game. However, there are two new Nash
Equilibria, Dˆ ⊗ Qˆ and Qˆ⊗ Dˆ. The payoff to the one who resorts to strategy Dˆ is
5 cos2 γ and to the other adopting Qˆ is 5 sin2 γ. Since 5 cos2 γ > 5 sin2 γ for γth1 6
γ 6 γth2, the one choosing strategy Dˆ is better rewarded. Note that the physical
structure of the game is symmetric with respect to the interchange of the two players.
However, both Nash equilibrium Dˆ ⊗ Qˆ and Qˆ⊗ Dˆ cause the the unfairness of the
game. We think that there are two reasons for the asymmetry situation: (i) Since
the definition of Nash equilibrium allows multiple Nash Equilibria to coexist, the
solutions may be degenerate. Therefore the definition itself allows the possibility
of such an asymmetry. This situation is similar to the spontaneous symmetry
breaking; (ii) If we consider the two Nash Equilibria as a whole, they are fully
equivalent and the game remains symmetric. But finally, the two players have to
choose one from the two equilibria. This also causes the asymmetry of the game.
For γth2 6 γ 6 pi/2, the game shows exciting features. A novel Nash equilibrium
Qˆ⊗ Qˆ arises with $A(Qˆ, Qˆ) = $B(Qˆ, Qˆ) = 3, which satisfies the property of Pareto
Optimal. Therefore, as long as the the amount of entanglement exceeds a certain
threshold, the dilemma can be removed.
Fig 2 illustrates Alice’s payoff as a function of the parameter γ when both players
resort to Nash equilibrium. From this figure, we observe that the game’s property
depends discontinuously on the amount of the entanglement. This discontinuity
can be considered as entanglement correlated phase transition, i.e. the game can
be considered to lie in three different phases. For 0 6 γ 6 γth1, the game displays
no advantage over classical game. So this domain can be considered as the classical
phase. For γth1 6 γ 6 γth2, there are two Nash Equilibria for the game, both of
which yield asymmetric payoffs to the players. This domain can be considered as
the transitional phase from classical to quantum. For γth2 6 γ 6 pi/2, a novel Nash
equilibrium Qˆ⊗Qˆ appears with payoff (3, 3). This strategic profile has the property
to be Pareto Optimal and hence the dilemma disappears, and this domain can be
considered as the quantum phase.
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Fig 2. The expected payoff for Alice as a function of the measure of the parameter γ when both
players resort to Nash Equilibrium. For γth1 < γ < γth2, the dash line and the dot line represent
Alice’s payoff when the Nash Equilibrium is Dˆ ⊗ Qˆ and Qˆ⊗ Dˆ respectively.
One interesting thing should be pointed out is that if we change the numerical
values in the payoff table (Table 1), Fig 2 will varies interestingly. If these numerical
values satisfy some particular condition, the transition phase in which the game has
two asymmetric Nash equilibria will disappear. Furthermore, the phase transition
exhibit interesting variation with respect to the change of the numerical values
in the payoff matrix, so does the property of the game. For different numerical
values, the game may or may not have a transition phase, or even the classical and
quantum phases can overlap and form a new phase, the coexistence phase. The
detailed presentation can be found in [20].
2.1.3. General quantum operations
In a recent Letter, it was pointed out that restricting the strategic space of the play-
ers can not reflect any reasonable physical constraint because the set is not closed
under composition [18]. The observation is that any operation of the restricted
strategic space can consist of
{
Iˆ , σˆy , σˆz
}
with certain coefficients. Iˆ equivalent to
Cˆ operation, σˆy to Dˆ and σˆz to Qˆ. Note that σˆy is an optimal strategy counter to
Iˆ. And similarly σˆz is the ideal counter-strategy to σˆy. However, the best reply to
strategy σˆz, which is σˆx, is not included in this restricted strategic space. Thus, the
dilemma situation could be solved by applying Qˆ⊗ Qˆ. The general case is that the
player should be permitted free choice of any unitary operations. If so, the opera-
tion σˆx counter to σˆz is permitted. The interesting observation is that Iˆ is the ideal
counter-strategy if one’s opponent plays σˆx. Then
{
Iˆ , σˆx, σˆy, σˆz
}
forms a inter-
restricted cycle, and therefore if the amount of entanglement of the game’s state is
maximal, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this quantum game [18,19].
However, the game remains to have mixed Nash equilibria [19].
As we have seen in the preceding section, properties of quantum games change
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Fig 3. The expected payoff for Alice as a function of the measure of the parameter γ when both
players resort to Nash Equilibrium.
fascinatingly when the amount of the game’s entanglement varies. So, assuming
that the player could choose any strategy from the complete set of all local unitary
operations, it is then natural to investigate whether there exists pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for this game when the game is not maximally entangled. Here we show
that as long as the game’s entanglement is below a certain boundary [7], the game
has infinite number of pure Nash equilibria. While for entanglement beyond that
boundary, the game behaves the same as in the maximally entangled case.
The general form of 2 × 2 unitary matrix can be represented by Pauli matrices
as following:
Uˆ(w, x, y, z) = wIˆ + ix · σˆx + iy · σˆy + iz · σˆz, (9)
where all the coefficients w, x, y and z are real and satisfy the normalization con-
dition
w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 = 1. (10)
We plot Alice’s payoff as a function of the parameter γ when both players resort
to Nash equilibrium in Fig 3. γB = arcsin
√
1/3 is the boundary of the game’s
entanglement. For 0 6 γ 6 γB , we find that there are infinite number of Nash
equilibrium for any determined value of γ. But as long as the γ is given, no matter
which profile Nash equilibrium the players choose, the payoffs for both players are
determined and are the same, which are $A = $B = 1 + 2 sin
2 γ. It shows that
the payoff of each player is a monotonous increasing function of γ. But if the
entanglement of the game’s state exceeds the boundary γB, the game will have no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. So we have shown that if the strategic space of the
players is all of SU (2), the entanglement could still enhance the property of this
quantum game.
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Fig 4. The payoff Table of the 3-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. The first entry in the parenthesis
denotes the payoff of Alice, the second number denotes the payoff of Bob, and the third number
denotes the payoff of Colin.
2.2. Multiplayer quantum games
The effect of “two’s company, three’s a crowd” is quite familiar in physical world [11].
Complex phenomenon tends to emerge in multipartite systems. Hence, to investi-
gate multiplayer quantum games in multi-qubit system will be more interesting and
significant. Recently, quantum games with more than two players was firstly inves-
tigated and such games can exhibit certain forms of pure quantum equilibrium that
have no analog in classical games, or even in two player quantum games [12, 21].
In the following discussion, we investigate multiplayer quantum games with the
particular case of the three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since the structure of the
game is symmetric, and for more explicit expression, our investigation focus on the
symmetric solution of the game. In this case, we will show that the quantum game
can display miscellaneous qualities under different conditions. At first, let’s extend
the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma to the three-player case.
2.2.1. Three-player prisoner’s dilemma
The scenario of the three player Prisoners’ Dilemma is similar to the two-player
situation [1]. Besides Alice and Bob, a third player, Colin joins this game. They
are picked up by the police and interrogated in separate cells without a chance to
communicate with each other. For the purpose of this game, it makes no difference
whether or not Alice, Bob or Colin actually committed the crime. The players are
told the same thing: If they all choose strategy D (defect), each of them will get
payoff 1; if the players all resort to strategy C (cooperate), each of them will get
payoff 3; if one of the players choose D but the other two do not, 5 is payoff for the
former and 2 for the latter two; if one of the players choose C while the other two
adopt D, 0 is payoff for the former and 4 for the latter two.
Fig 4 indicates the payoffs of the three players depending on their decisions. The
game is symmetric for the three players, and the strategy D dominates strategy C
for all of them. Since the selfish players all choose D as optimal strategy, the
unique Nash equilibrium is (D,D,D) with payoff (1, 1, 1). This is a Pareto inferior
outcome, since (C,C,C) with payoffs (3, 3, 3) would be better for all three players.
Optimizing the outcome for a subsystem will in general not optimize the outcome
for the system as a whole. This situation is the very catch of the dilemma and the
same as the two-player version of this game.
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2.2.2. Quantization scheme
Our physical model for quantizing this game is similar as in [12] — see Fig 5. Just
like the quantization scheme of the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, here we send
each player a two state system or a qubit and they can locally manipulate their
individual qubit. The possible outcomes of the classical strategies “Cooperate” and
“Defect” are assigned to two basis vector
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
(11)
in the Hilbert space. In the procedure of the game, its state is described by a vector
in the tensor product space which is spanned by the eight classical basis
∣∣∣σσ′σ′′〉 (
σ, σ
′
, σ
′′ ∈ {0, 1}), where the first, second and third entries belonging to Alice, Bob
and Colin, respectively. At the beginning of the game the game’s state is |000〉.
After the unitary transformation J , the initial state of the game is
|ψi〉 = Jˆ |000〉 , (12)
where
Jˆ = exp
{
i
γ
2
σx ⊗ σx ⊗ σx
}
, (13)
with 0 6 γ 6 pi/2, is the entangling gate of the game and is known to all of the
players. Strategic move of Alice (Bob or Colin) is denoted by unitary operator UˆA
(UˆB or UˆC), which are chosen from a certain strategic space S. Since the strategic
moves of different players are independent, one player’s operator just operates on
his individual qubit. After the operations of the players, the final state of the game
prior to the measurement is give by
|ψf 〉 =
∣∣∣ψf (UˆA, UˆB, UˆC)〉
= Jˆ†
(
UˆA ⊗ UˆB ⊗ UˆC
)
Jˆ |000〉 . (14)
Hence, the final state of the game can be represented by density matrix
ρf = |ψf 〉 〈ψf | .
Here, we will use the density matrix to get the final payoff for the players. This final
state go forward to the subsequent measurement instrument and the players can
get a reward according to their individual payoff operators. The payoff operators
can be directly given from the corresponding entries of payoff matrix. For example,
the payoff operator of Alice can be written as
$ˆA = 5 |100〉 〈100|+ 4 (|110〉 〈110|+ |101〉 〈101|)
+3 |000〉 〈000|+ 2 (|001〉 〈001|+ |010〉 〈010|)
+1 |111〉 〈111|+ 0 |011〉 〈011| . (15)
Hence the expectation value of Alice’s payoff is given by
$A (UA, UB, UC) = tr
[
$ˆAρf
]
. (16)
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Fig 5. The setup of three-player quantum games.
Since the game is symmetric for three players, the payoff functions of Bob and
Colin can also be obtained directly from the same analyzing together with the
payoff matrix (see Fig 4).
2.2.3. Two-parameter strategic set
We start investigation of three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma with restricted strategic
space, i.e. the strategic space is a two-parameter set [21]. The matrix representation
of the corresponding operators is taken to be
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) =
(
cos θ/2 eiϕ sin θ/2
−e−iϕ sin θ/2 cos θ/2
)
(17)
with 0 6 θ 6 pi and 0 6 ϕ 6 pi/2. To be specific, Uˆ (0, 0) is the identity operator
Iˆ which corresponds to “Cooperate”, and Uˆ (pi, pi/2) = iσx, which is equivalent to
the bit-flipping operator, corresponds to “Defect”. Therefore Jˆ commutes with any
operator formed from iσx and Iˆ acting on different qubits, and this guarantees that
the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma is faithfully entailed in the quantum game.
If there is no entanglement (for γ = 0), the game is separable, i.e. at each
instance the state of the game is separable. We find that any strategy profile
formed from Uˆ (pi, pi/2) = iσx and Uˆ (pi, 0) = iσy is Nash equilibrium. However this
property of multiple equilibria is a trivial one. For any profile of Nash equilibrium of
the separable game, because iσx |0〉 = i |1〉 and iσy |0〉 = − |1〉, the final state |ψf 〉 =
− (−i)n |1〉 |1〉 |1〉, where n denotes the number of players who adopts Uˆ (pi/2, pi) =
iσx. According to the payoff functions in Eq. (15), each player receives payoff
1. Hence in this case iσx and iσy have the same effect to the payoffs. And in
this sense, all the Nash Equilibria are equivalent to the classical strategy profile
(D,D,D). Indeed, the separable game does not exceed the classical game.
Although unentangled games is trivial, the behavior of maximally entangled
game is fascinating and surprising. The profile iσx⊗ iσx⊗ iσx is no longer the Nash
equilibrium. However, a new Nash equilibrium, iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy (iσy = U(pi, 0)),
emerges with payoffs
$A (iσy, iσy, iσy) = $B (iσy, iσy, iσy) = $C (iσy, iσy, iσy) = 3. (18)
Indeed, for γ = pi/2,
$A
(
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσy, iσy
)
= (2 + 2 cos 2ϕ) sin2
θ
2
6 3 = $A (iσy, iσy, iσy) (19)
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for all θ ∈ [0, pi] and ϕ ∈ [0, pi/2]. Analogously
$B
(
iσy, Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσy
)
6 $B (iσy, iσy, iσy) ,
$C
(
iσy, iσy, Uˆ (θ, ϕ)
)
6 $C (iσy, iσy, iσy) . (20)
Hence, no player can improve his individual payoff by unilaterally deviating from the
strategy iσy, i.e. (iσy, iσy, iσy) is a Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to see that
the payoffs for the players are $A = $B = $C = 3, which are the best payoffs that
retain the symmetry of the game. Thus the strategy profile (iσy, iσy, iσy) has the
property of Pareto Optimal, i.e. no player can increase his payoff without lessening
the payoff of the other players by deviating from this pair of strategies. Therefore
by allowing the players to adopt quantum strategies, the dilemma that exists in the
classical game is completely removed when the game is maximally entangled.
In the above paragraph, we have considered the maximally entangled game. In
this case, an novel Nash equilibrium (iσy, iσy, iσy) emerges, which has the property
of Pareto optimal. Since the key role of entanglement in quantum information, it will
be interesting to investigate whether this strategy profile is still Nash equilibrium
when the game is not maximal entangled. And if it is, how the property of the
game changes with the variations of the entanglement when the players each resort
to iσy = U(pi, 0). The surprising thing is that iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy is always a Nash
equilibrium for any γ ∈ (0, pi/2). The proof that this pair of strategy is still Nash
equilibrium runs as follows. Assume Bob and Colin adopt iσy as their strategies,
the payoff function of Alice respect to her strategy Uˆ (θ, ϕ) is
$A
(
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσy, iσy
)
=
(
1 + 2 cos2 ϕ sin2 γ
)
sin2
θ
2
6 1 + 2 sin2 γ = $A (iσy, iσy, iσy) . (21)
So, iσy is her best reply to the other players. Since the game is symmetric, the
same holds for Bob and Colin. Therefore, no matter what the amount of the
game’s entanglement is, iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy is always a Nash equilibrium for the game.
It is fascinating to see that the payoff of the players is a monotonously increasing
function of amount of the entanglement,
$A (iσy, iσy, iσy) = $B (iσy, iσy, iσy) = $C (iσy, iσy, iσy) = 1 + 2 sin
2 γ. (22)
Fig 6 illustrates how the payoffs depend on the amount of entanglement when
the players all resort to Nash equilibrium. From this figure, we can see that en-
tanglement dominates the property of the game: the payoffs of the players are the
same, which is a monotonous increasing function of the amount of entanglement of
the game’s initial state. The profile iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy is always a Nash equilibrium of
the game independent of the entanglement, and the dilemma is completely removed
when the measure of game’s entanglement γ increases to its maximum pi/2.
2.2.4. General unitary operations
In this section, we turn our attention to a more general situation, in which players
are allowed to adopt strategies from the whole unitary operations. Just like in the
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Fig 6. The payoff plot as a function of γ when all the players resort to Nash Equilibrium, iσy ⊗
iσy ⊗ iσy . From this figure we can see that the payoffs of the players are the same and are
monotonous increasing function of γ.
two-player situation, the unitary operation can be denoted as in Eq. (9). Therefore
a player’s strategy can be represented by a vector (w, x, y, z).
At first, let us consider the case when the amount of entanglement is maximal.
We have known that in two player’s Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium existing of the whole unitary space. However, the situation is
completely different in the three-player version of this game. There indeed exist six
symmetric Nash Equilibria strategy profiles K1 ⊗K1 ⊗K1, · · · · · ·, K6 ⊗K6 ⊗K6
with
K1 =
(
1√
2
, 0,
1√
2
, 0
)
,
K2 =
(
1√
2
, 0,− 1√
2
, 0
)
,
K3 =
(
− 1
2
√
2
,
√
3
2
√
2
,
1
2
√
2
,
√
3
2
√
2
)
,
K4 =
(
1
2
√
2
,−
√
3
2
√
2
,
1
2
√
2
,
√
3
2
√
2
)
,
K5 =
(
1
2
√
2
,
√
3
2
√
2
,− 1
2
√
2
,
√
3
2
√
2
)
,
K6 =
(
1
2
√
2
,
√
3
2
√
2
,
1
2
√
2
,−
√
3
2
√
2
)
.
These six Nash Equilibria are symmetric to the players and yields the same payoff
11/4 to the three players. Hence, these Nash equilibrium keeps the symmetry and
fairness of the game, and are more efficient than the classical Nash equilibrium
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(D,D,D). In the following, we will take K1⊗K1⊗K1 as an example to prove that
it is truly a Nash equilibrium of the game. We write the strategy K1 in matrix form
K1 =
1√
2
· I + 0 · iσx + 1√
2
· iσy + 0 · iσz
=
(
1√
2
1√
2
− 1√
2
1√
2
)
.
Assume Bob and Colin both choose strategy K1, according to payoff function of
Alice (see Eq. (15))
$A(UA,K1,K1) =
1
4
[
11
(
w2 + y2
)
+ 10
(
x2 + z2
)]
. (23)
From Eq. (23), we can see that $A(UA,K1,K1) reaches maximum if w
2 + y2 = 1.
It is obviously that w = y = 1/
√
2 satisfies this condition. Therefore, Alice can
get her best payoff when she chooses K1 against the other two players’ strategies
K1 ⊗ K1. Because the game is symmetric, the same analysis is true for Bob and
Colin. So K1 ⊗ K1 ⊗ K1 is a Nash equilibrium of the game for the whole set of
unitary operations, which means that no player can increase his individual payoff
by unilateral deviating from the strategy profile. From our proof, we can see that
when both Bob and Colin adopt K1, there exist other strategies that can yield the
maximal payoff 11/4 to Alice. Hence, K1 ⊗K1 ⊗K1 is Nash equilibrium, but not
a strict one, as are the other five equilibria.
2.2.5. Non-maximal entanglement situation
Unlike the situation of restricted strategic space, this time the non-maximal en-
tanglement situation is more complex and more interesting. Since the solution we
study here is symmetric and fair to the players, we will take Alice as an instance.
Fig 7 depict Alice Payoff as a function of γ when the players all resort to Nash
equilibrium strategy. From Fig 7, we see that the entanglement of the game is
divided into four domain by three thresholds, that are
γth1 = arccos
√√√√ 1
26
(
13 +
√
3
221
(
759 + 128
√
42
)) ∼= 0.60276,
γth2 = arcsin
√
1
3
∼= 0.61548,
γth3 =
pi
4
∼= 0.78539. (24)
In the domain 0 6 γ 6 γth2, there exist four Nash equilibria of the game, which
are (0, 0,±1, 0) and
(
0,
√
3
2
,± 1
2
, 0
)
. These four Nash equilibria yield the same payoff
1 + 2 sin2 γ. Hence, the player’s reward is a monotonous increasing function of γ,
i.e. the game’s property is enhance by the property of the game’s entanglement. In
the domain γth1 6 γ 6 γth3, the situation is very complex. The Nash equilibria of
the game can be represented as the following:
± [a (γ) (0, 0, 1, 0)− b (γ) (0, 0, 0,±1)]
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Fig 7. The expected payoff for Alice as a function of the measure of the parameter γ when all
players resort to Nash Equilibrium strategies.
and
±
[
a (γ)
(√
3
2
, 0, 0,±1
2
)
− b (γ)
(
0,
√
3
2
,±1
2
, 0
)]
,
where a (γ), b (γ) > 0 and a (γ)
2
+ b (γ)
2
= 1. From Fig 7, we see that (i) the
payoff in this domain is bigger than the first domain and (ii) it also increases with
the increasing of entanglement. Hence, we can also get the conclusion that in this
domain, the game’s property can be enhanced by the entanglement of the game’s
state. In the domain γth3 6 γ < pi/2, there is no symmetric pure Nash equilibrium.
This situation is the same as the two-player version of this game.
3. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the systematic investigation of quantum games with the
particular case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. By considering different situations, the
game shows properties which may outperform the classical version of this game.
Quantum games and quantum strategies is a burgeoning field of quantum in-
formation and quantum computation theory. Assuming the players are playing the
game by quantum rules, the game’s solution is more efficient than the classical one.
Such quantum games are not just esoteric exercises. They could form part of the
longed-for quantum technologies of tomorrow, such as ultra-fast quantum comput-
ers. They might even help traders construct a crash-resistant stock market. And
quantum games could provide new insights into puzzling natural phenomena such
as high-temperature superconductivity etc.. Although at this stage, no one is sure
which applications will prove most fruitful, it is sure that quantum game theory is
a potential and promising research field [3]. Playing by quantum rules, every one
will become a winner [22].
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